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Gender Quotas, Women’s Representation,
and Legislative Diversity
Tiffany D. Barnes, University of Kentucky
Mirya R. Holman, Tulane University

Diversity in the characteristics of political leaders increases the quality of policy, perceptions of legitimacy, and accountability to constituents. Yet, increasing leaders’ diversity proves one of the most difﬁcult challenges facing modern
democracy. Efforts like gender quotas shift descriptive representation on the targeted characteristic, but critics argue
that women selected via quotas are as homogenous as those selected via traditional methods. In this article, we theorize
that quotas (re)conceptualize views of potential political leaders and transform party recruitment networks. In doing so,
quotas increase the diversity of all leaders in ofﬁce. We evaluate these claims with a new measure of diversity and a data
set of over 1,700 legislators in Argentinian subnational government. We show that quotas increase the professional and
personal diversity of women and men in ofﬁce over time, suggesting that electoral gender quotas transform parties,
political networks, and how women (and men) perceive political ofﬁce.

D

iversity among the personal and professional characteristics, experiences, and backgrounds of public
ofﬁcials is fundamental for political representation
(Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2014; Hughes 2011).
Characteristics like gender, race, class, parental status, education, and occupation can shape representatives’ preferences
and priorities (Barnes 2016; Barnes, Beall, and Holman 2020;
Holman 2015) and inﬂuence the type of legislation they advocate for, introduce, and support (Barnes et al. 2020; Clayton
and Zetterberg 2018; O’Grady 2019). Despite signiﬁcant interest in electing a descriptively representative group of leaders,
increasing the diversity of representation has proved to be a
difﬁcult task. Indeed, one of the great challenges of democracies in the twenty-ﬁrst century has been uncovering ways
to increase the diversity of those who serve in political ofﬁce
(Childs and Hughes 2018; Kerevel 2019; O’Brien 2015).
One method of increasing the descriptive diversity of
political bodies has been to institute quotas that mandate
a level of representation on the ballot or in the decisionmaking body by women, racial and ethnic minorities, or

other underrepresented groups (Krook and O’Brien 2010).
Quotas effectively increase women’s numeric representation
(Schwindt-Bayer 2009), but debates continue over the deeper
effects of quotas, particularly whether quotas change how
institutions operate (Verge and Claveria 2016) or merely select representatives with similar backgrounds to those elected
via traditional mechanisms (Nugent and Krook 2016). These
discussions raise the question: Do gender quotas just increase
descriptive representation, or do they produce comprehensive changes in the characteristics of those who serve in political ofﬁce?
We contribute to the literature by theorizing that quotas
change how parties work, how networks operate, and how
individuals engage with politics through two complementary
mechanisms. First, quotas redeﬁne potential leaders’ and
political parties’ perceptions of an ideal candidate by reshaping the legislature descriptively. Speciﬁcally, as the share
of women in political ofﬁce grows, so does an understanding
that a broader set of politicians, with diverse qualiﬁcations,
can lead (Alexander 2012; Beauregard 2017). We should,
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thus, see a direct connection between increasing the descriptive representation of women in ofﬁce and the diversity
of leaders who hold positions in that body. Second, quotas
disrupt gendered institutional patterns (or that institutions
operate in ways constrained by and constraining of gender)
and force parties to expand their recruiting patterns (Hawkesworth 2003; Hinojosa and Correa 2016). Indeed, quotas have
the potential of interrupting the insular and homophilic
networks of parties (Butler and Preece 2016; Crowder-Meyer
and Cooperman 2018; Weeks 2018), including how they recruit candidates and decide strategically to place candidates
on the ballot (Jones 2012; Kerevel 2015). The longer a quota is
in place (especially when combined with a high rate of turnover), the more the diversity of elected ofﬁcials should increase. Further, our theory implies that both mechanisms
foster opportunities not only among women but also among
men, as the networks and perceptions of leaders that exclude
women from ofﬁce also limit some men’s access. This is critical, as a dearth of men’s diversity has substantial consequences for the quality of representation (Murray 2014; TaylorRobinson 2010) and for citizens attachments to representative
institutions (Barnes and Saxton 2019).
We evaluate the implications of our theory with a novel,
holistic, and multifaceted measure of legislative diversity, which
we adapted from measures of population diversity (Hero 2000)
and a new data set that includes our coding of the backgrounds
of more than 1,700 legislators across 10 provincial chambers in
Argentina in multiple electoral cycles (a total of 36 chamberyears). We take advantage of the variation in implementation
and success of Argentina’s provincial gender quota (Barnes 2016)
to examine the relationship between women’s numeric representation, the time since quota adoption, and legislative diversity.
Further, we leverage insights from interviews with provinciallevel politicians to contextualize our quantitative results.
We approach the idea of diversity from a holistic standpoint by adopting a measure that examines various characteristics of legislative representatives through aggregate,
rather than discrete, categories. In doing so, we argue that
one appropriate direction for research on descriptive representation is to adopt a comprehensive evaluation of diversity that incorporates the crosscutting cleavages in who
holds political ofﬁce. Thus, we build on scholarship on the
diversity among women (Brown and Gershon 2016; Cassese
and Barnes 2019; Farris and Holman 2014; Strolovitch 2006)
and on class differences (Barnes and Saxton 2019; Barnes
et al. 2020; Taylor-Robinson 2010), to account for the interactions across indicators of diversity. A measure that simultaneously accounts for different forms of diversity allows for
a more ﬂexible view, one that incorporates diversity in and
across both heterogeneous and homogeneous populations.

We ﬁnd that the time since quota adoption has a strong
positive association with professional and personal diversity
indexes across Argentinian subnational legislatures. Further,
the percentage of women in the political body is associated
with increases in diversity, suggesting a twofold effect of
gender quotas: the time that quotas are in place is associated
with increases in diversity, but quotas also increase women’s
numeric representation, which has an independent and
positive association with diversity. These ﬁndings, combined
with evidence from elite interviews, bring to bear important
evidence in support of our theory that quotas transform
patterns of political recruitment. If party leaders responded
to quotas by simply recruiting women who conform to the
established political proﬁle or by selecting unqualiﬁed women,
increases in women’s numeric representation would not be
associated with changes in men’s diversity. This relationship
between women’s access to ofﬁce and men’s diversity is consistent with recent literature demonstrating that quotas serve
to erode gendered legislative patterns by improving the overall competence of the legislature by disrupting “cozy arrangements” among mediocre leaders (Besley et al. 2017). Our
ﬁndings thus underscore the ability of institutional changes to
redeﬁne political cultures, challenge entrenched gendered
norms, and restructure political party behavior.

DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL
NETWORKS, AND DIVERSITY
Gender quotas have “been perhaps the most radical and
intensely debated reform in the area of gender equality in the
past ﬁfty to sixty years” (Zetterberg 2009, 715). Quotas inﬂuence the gender composition of those who serve in political ofﬁce by requiring that women make up a particular
proportion of political candidates or ofﬁcials (Hughes 2011;
Jones 1998; Krook 2004). Some proponents of quotas argue
that quotas have been successful, in that they have accomplished the overall goal: to increase the number of women in
ofﬁce. Others argue that for quotas to be successful, they
need to disrupt gendered institutional patterns (Clayton and
Zetterberg 2018; Nugent and Krook 2016).
What would it look like if gender quotas disrupted the
“rules of the game”? In politics, both formal and informal
processes are gendered (Krook and Mackay 2011). The idea
that simply increasing women’s numeric representation
without changing other institutional processes will transform the gendered nature of politics runs counter to a substantial literature on gendered institutions (Hawkesworth
2003). We argue that beyond simply bringing more women
into the legislature, quotas can disrupt the gendered nature
of politics over time by altering conceptualizations of political leaders and transforming political party recruitment
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patterns. For these two reasons, we argue that quotas can
have downstream effects for increasing the diversity of both
men and women in elected ofﬁce.

REDEFINING AND GENDERING
QUALITY CANDIDATES
Gendered norms and processes govern candidate selection
and recruitment. For example, when leaders attempt to identify quality candidates, they may place more value on masculine attributes and characteristics; these decisions shape the
supply and demand of women running for ofﬁce. As there are
likely fewer women than men who possess masculine attributes, the supply of women who ﬁt the masculine concept of
“quality” may be low (Murray 2014; Oliver and Conroy 2017).
Moreover, if parties privilege masculine characteristics, this
also reduces the demand for women (Crowder-Meyer 2013;
Verge and Claveria 2016). In this way, “political parties may
select their candidates on the basis of subtly gendered criteria,
which shapes the available supply of female candidates and
may also result in women selecting themselves out of the
process” (Kenny 2013, 23). The practice of seeking individuals
with masculine characteristics and then failing to ﬁnd a robust
pool of women with those characteristics reafﬁrms gendered
patterns of recruitment. The pattern is unlikely to change unless an interruption, such as the implementation of a gender
quota, forces party leaders to look outside their normal pools
or apply new criteria for selection.
We argue that the adoption of gender quotas may disrupt
these gendered norms of political recruitment by redeﬁning
candidate quality. That is, to ﬁll quotas, party leaders may be
forced to expand their deﬁnition of “quality” candidates to
those who do not necessarily have masculine characteristics.
This might include nominees who possess a wider range of
characteristics and backgrounds. Likewise, individuals with
marginalized identities and those who have not held the
typical pipeline careers may be more likely to see themselves
as potential leaders (e.g., Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007; but
see Zetterberg 2009). Research on role model effects have
found that exemplars can reshape how an underrepresented
group sees their own capacity to lead, “symboliz[ing] a more
open political arena,” which changes “beliefs about the
group’s role in politics” (Alexander 2012, 437; Holman and
Schneider 2018). And, as potential candidates are rational
and strategic, they are more likely to seek ofﬁce in circumstances where they will be selected (Bernick and Heidbreder
2018). Consequently, increasing women’s access to ofﬁce
may work to change how both party leaders and potential
candidates perceive who is viewed as an acceptable leader.
Evolving perceptions of candidate quality can thus work to
unpin gendered patterns of candidate supply and demand.
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Implicit in this argument is the idea that by increasing
women’s representation, the diversity of those who serve in
political ofﬁce will also increase. Quotas are simply a mechanism for increasing descriptive representation, and other
methods of increasing descriptive representation (such as
candidate trainings or donor networks) would produce the
same outcome of increasing the diversity of politicians. Under this assumption, as the proportion of women in a political
body increases, so should the diversity of people in the body.
Thus, we posit the following hypothesis:
H1. Increases in women’s descriptive representation
will be positively associated with legislative diversity.

ERODING THE GENDERED NATURE
OF RECRUITMENT
We further theorize that the implementation of quotas over
time can disrupt the gendered nature of political recruitment
by inciting parties to change their recruitment patterns and
processes, which is impactful, given the centrality of parties
in most political systems. In short, we argue that the adoption of quotas alone is likely insufﬁcient to engender change.
If coupled with high turnover, however, quotas will transform the recruitment process, as parties are thus required to
replenish the supply of women for their lists over time. For
this reason, quotas likely produce more diversity over time
when combined with higher legislative turnover.
In political systems with low turnover, political parties
could comply with gender quotas by only identifying a few
women. As such, the quota would not reshape the networks
and mechanisms of selection. Party leaders are most likely to
ﬁrst consider women who are involved in their immediate
social, organizational, and occupational networks (Kenny
2013; Verge and Claveria 2016). These networks matter: the
homophily of elite networks (Kerevel 2019) means that leaders recruited from insular networks are more likely to have
homogenous backgrounds and characteristics (Bjarnegård
2013). Indeed, the initial adoption of gender quotas frequently
led to the recruitment of women primarily from inﬂuential
political families, with some quotas explicitly seen as a tool for
cultivating “obedient” women (Carrió 2003, 170) who would
owe their allegiance to their party and their powerful political
families.1 Thus, if a political body has very high incumbency
rates and low levels of turnover (e.g., US Congress), then
parties will need to recruit an initial cohort of women when

1. Although quotas may extended the practice of political nepotism to
women, this was already a common method of candidate selection used
among male politicians (Murray 2014).
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the quota is implemented; in subsequent elections, large numbers of the same women may pursue reelection. Thus, absent
electoral turnover, quotas may not require parties to look beyond their established networks.
And yet, turnover itself (absent quotas) is likely insufﬁcient to diversify the backgrounds of legislators. Parties “seek
candidates for elected ofﬁce who mirror their own image”
(Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2016, 6) by recruiting from eligibility pools; these pools are functional because
they contain individuals who parties believe can win elections
and because party leaders (who are mostly men; see Barnes
2016; Morgan and Hinojosa 2018; O’Brien 2015) satisﬁce in
recruiting by selecting individuals like themselves (CrowderMeyer 2013; Cruz, Labonne, and Querubín 2017). These
patterns mean that the “political elite literally reproduce themselves” (Prewitt and Stone 1973, 133). As individuals are
recruited from these networks, the positions are reﬁlled, and
networks are replicated by those with similar backgrounds
and characteristics (Mäkelä, Björkman, and Ehrnrooth 2010).
Thus, absent an institutional change, high turnover is insufﬁcient to cultivate a more diverse pool of candidates.
We argue that the use of quotas over time—as the legislative body turns over—requires parties to change their
recruitment patterns. That is, the number of women in
established circles of power are likely too few to comply
with quota requirements over several electoral cycles in
places where legislators rarely serve multiple terms, as is the
case across most of Latin America and in many Western
European countries (Gouglas, Maddens, and Brans 2018;
Martínez Rosón 2011). In this circumstance, where high
turnover demands a larger supply of candidates and quotas
require an inﬂux of women into these positions, parties
may be forced to recruit outside normal networks. The effect
of quotas on political party behavior thus may break some of
the gendered institutional patterns that formerly governed
which networks served as the foundation for political party
recruiting (Bjarnegård 2013). As these networks expand,
heterogeneity in the backgrounds and characteristics of the
people recruited for ofﬁce should also increase. Thus, if it is
the case that quotas promote changes in political recruitment patterns, it implies that the longer quotas are in place
in political contexts with high turnover, the more parties
will need to draw women from a wider array of networks
and, consequently, the more diversity we should observe
among the group of people who hold ofﬁce. Accordingly, we
hypothesize:
H2. The number of years since the adoption of legislative gender quotas will be positively associated
with legislative diversity.

GENDER QUOTAS AND MEN’S
LEGISLATIVE DIVERSITY
Although men dominate most legislatures, this does not mean
that all men have a chance to serve in political ofﬁce. Indeed,
men’s access is similarly restricted by the very narrow and elite
pool of acceptable candidates (Barnes and Saxton 2019; Besley
et al. 2017; O'Grady 2019). Yet, as we explain, an implication
of our theory is that the adoption of quotas should also work
to diversify the composition of men in ofﬁce and the composition of the legislature more broadly. We posit that a more
diverse group of male legislators is likely to be elected to ofﬁce
when there is a broader conceptualization of quality candidates
and when parties recruit candidates from beyond their traditional power networks.
Our argument suggests that two of the major concerns
about gender quotas may be incorrect. Previously, critics have
claimed that while quotas increase the descriptive representation of women, they do so by selecting an elite group of
representatives that mirror women elected without quotas or
an unqualiﬁed group of representatives (Nugent and Krook
2016). If all quotas do is elect a larger group of women that
mirrors those elected without quotas, then quotas should have
no effect on men, other than depressing the total number of
men who hold ofﬁce. If anything, we should anticipate that as
women’s numeric representation increases (and thus, men’s
numeric representation decreases), men in ofﬁce should become more homogenous, as men’s legislative access will be
restricted to the most elite candidates (Besley et al. 2017).
Moreover, if increases in women’s access to ofﬁce only serve to
bring more unqualiﬁed women into the fold, this too should
have no bearing on men’s legislative diversity. The lack of
“qualiﬁed” women would not alter the pool of “qualiﬁed” men.
Thus, if quotas do not increase the diversity of women, or only
do so by ﬁlling seats with unqualiﬁed women, then men
should remain unaffected.
But, what if quotas do increase the diversity of women
in ofﬁce through the mechanisms we posited? If so, these
changes should also cultivate diversity among male legislators. That is, as women’s numeric representation increases,
women with different backgrounds and different credentials
enter politics. Their presence serves to transform the accepted
deﬁnition of quality candidates. As women break the mold of a
traditional politician, party leaders and potential male candidates
may foster a broader conception of viable political candidates.
As the deﬁnition of quality candidates evolves, men from outside
of the traditional pipelines may become political aspirants. If
so, we should observe support for the following hypothesis:
H3. Increases in women’s numeric representation will
be positively associated with men’s legislative diversity.
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Figure 1. Time line of Argentinian provincial quota adoption and women’s representation. Solid line is the proportion of provincial chambers with some form
of legislative gender quota. Dashed line is the average share of women across all provincial legislative chambers. Source: Barnes (2016).

By a similar logic, if political parties look to ﬁll quotas
only by choosing women from within established networks,
the recruitment of women should have no effect on patterns
of recruitment of men, given that the party networks will
remain exclusive and insular (Kenny 2013). It is our contention, however, that gender quotas disrupt gendered patterns of political recruitment. Thus, if gender quotas encourage parties to alter their political recruitment process to
draw candidates from new and different networks, this will
shape the type of men who are recruited into ofﬁce. And,
if gender quotas work to break down exclusive patterns of
political recruitment, supplanting these methods with an approach that draws candidates from more diverse networks,
then the longer quotas are in place, the more diversity we
should see among men in ofﬁce. As such, we evaluate the
following hypothesis:
H4. Increases in the number of years since the adoption of legislative gender quotas will be positively associated with men’s legislative diversity.

THE ARGENTINE CASE
To test our hypotheses, we leverage subnational data from
provincial legislatures in Argentina. Argentina is a federal
republic with 23 provinces and an autonomous Federal District. The subnational analysis facilitates a comparison in legislative diversity across a large number of cases over a substantial
number of years, where numerous chambers successfully implemented gender quotas and other potentially confounding
country-level factors are held constant. The subnational analysis
of Argentina is particularly well suited to test our hypotheses.
The staggered quota diffusion across the provinces (Barnes
2016) offers an opportunity for us to test our expectations.
Figure 1 presents a timeline of our data set, with the years

(X-axis) and share of chambers that have adopted a quota
and percentage of women in the chamber (Y-axes). The variation in adoption enables us to assess how increases in the
number of quota years relate to legislative diversity. In all but
one case, gender quota legislation was adopted in conjunction with placement mandates, requiring women to be placed
in electable positions on all party lists (typically interpreted
to mean a woman must be placed in every third position on
the ballot), and enforcement mechanisms barring parties that
do not comply with these regulations from competing in the
election.2 As a result, women hold a sizable share of seats in
every chamber in our sample where quotas are in use. And
yet, variation in women’s numeric representation is still present across chambers and over time (ranging from 19% to 45%
women in chambers with quotas in our sample), partially
owing to variations in provincial electoral laws (Jones 1998).
Variation in women’s numeric representation is critical for
assessing the relationship between women’s numeric representation and legislative diversity independent of successful
gender quotas.
Our theory suggests that gender quotas can incite parties
to change the recruitment patterns and processes when political parties are central to candidate selection and recruitment, as is the case in Argentina. Provincial-level parties rely
on elite arrangements, assembly election, and direct primaries to elect candidates (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002).
In each circumstance, recruitment and nomination is concentrated in the hands of the local party bosses, not voters or
even incumbent legislators. Party bosses arrange a list of

2. Given that penalties prohibit parties who do not comply with the
quota from competing in elections, all political parties abide by the quotas.
As a result, women are not systematically more represented in some parties
than in others.
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negotiated candidates to compete in elections. The provincial party organizations are so strong that Levitsky (2001)
describes them as being able to effectively resist any efforts
from the national party organization to inﬂuence the candidate nomination process. Instead, party bosses rely on insular political networks (often maintaining control of the
provincial parties for decades) to replenish the candidate
supply (Levitsky 2001). Further, in an effort to secure their
own political power and avoid being challenged by competent politicians, party bosses frequently rotate politicians
through different political posts or simply curtail their political careers (Jones 2012; Micozzi 2014).
Finally, the Argentinian provinces also provide an excellent test case because legislative turnover for both men
and women is very high: only about 20% of provincial legislators go on to serve a second term in ofﬁce (Barnes 2016).
High levels of legislative turnover could force party leaders to
eventually look beyond their narrow eligibility pool to recruit women, resulting in more legislative diversity (Kerevel
and Atkeson 2013). In provinces with legislative gender quotas,
the obligation party leaders have to comply with gender quotas
is ampliﬁed by the high turnover rate, as parties must ﬁeld a
large number of women in these legislative elections.

EXPLAINING LEGISLATIVE DIVERSITY:
DATA AND ANALYSIS
Our data come from 10 subnational legislative chambers
(across six provinces) in Argentina from 2006 to 2014, for a
total of 36 chamber-years (see table A1 for sample details;
tables A1–A5 are available online). Speciﬁcally, the data in
our analysis were collected following provincial elections,
such that each year represents a new (or partially new) cohort of legislators. All but two of the chambers included in
our sample use partial renovation to elect half of the seats in
ofﬁce once every two years. The remaining two chambers use
full renovation and hold elections once every four years. Our
analysis includes every election year in every provincial legislative chamber for which there were systematic data
available for the dependent variable. Finally, we draw on insights gained from interviews with provincial-level politicians
to further contextualize our quantitative results.3

Measuring legislative diversity as our
dependent variable
Have the gender quotas in Argentina introduced more diversity in the backgrounds of the women and men who serve
3. Barnes conducted interviews with over 200 current and former
provincial deputies, journalists, and other political elites in 19 Argentinian
provinces from 2009 to 2013.

in political ofﬁce? We code and analyze an existing directory of the professional and personal backgrounds of subnational legislators in Argentina (Directorio Legislativo; for
research using the national legislative proﬁles, see Barnes and
Holman 2019; Franceschet and Piscopo 2014; Micozzi 2018).
The Directorio has been compiled by a nongovernmental
organization since 2006 at the provincial level and provides
the personal background, prior political ofﬁces, professional
occupations, and party experience of the legislators. We use
the data contained in the directory to create a new way
of measuring legislative diversity, which builds on measures
of state- and local-level diversity (Barnes and Holman 2019;
Hero 2000).
We aggregate this information about legislators’ personal and professional backgrounds to create two distinct
chamber-year-level measures of diversity such that our unit
of analysis is the chamber-year. The diversity measurement
strategy examines the level of diversity via a probability term,
where a single ﬁgure represents the proportion of characteristics on which a randomly drawn pair of individuals will
differ, assuming sampling with replacement. The ﬁgure is
adaptable to a wide set of types of diversity and is commonly
used in research on demographic diversity of geographic
areas (i.e., urban neighborhoods or states; Hero 2000). We
measure the diversity in each legislative body using a probability function:

okp1 Y
p

AW p 1 2

V

2
k

;

where AW is the weighted average of each chamber-year, Yk is
the proportion of the legislative body falling in a given category (k) within each of the variables (Y), V is the number of
variables, and p is the number of categories within all of the
variables.
Higher values indicate more diversity, while lower values
indicate less diversity. We use this measure to examine the
professional and personal diversity of politicians. Speciﬁcally, we construct a women’s professional diversity index.
To do so, we code whether (p1) or not (p0) each representative listed previously held (1) a public position, (2) a
private career position, (3) a position in a party organization,
(4) a political ofﬁce (an elected ofﬁcial, a political appointment in the executive, or a party leader), (5) a public or
private blue-collar position (service professions and workers),
(6) or a previous public or private white-collar position, such
as a lawyer, doctor, business person, or private sector professional.4 Categories are not mutually exclusive; some legislators
4. Although we account for whether individuals have previous political
experience, we do not incorporate variations in the level or type of political
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Figure 2. Chamber-wide professional (left) and personal (right) diversity measures by the percentage of women in the chamber (table A3 model 1, table A4
model 1) and the number of years since quota (table A3 model 2, table A4 model 3). Line represents correlation best ﬁt. Betas, standard errors, and
r-squared values from bivariate ordinary least squares regression models shown (see tables A3 and A4 for bivariate results). Individual components of the
indexes are compared against the percentage of women and quota years in ﬁgures A1 and A2.

report holding positions in multiple categories before election
(see codebook in app. B for full details; apps. A, B are available
online).
We focus on these measures because they represent the
traditional markers of political experience and policymaking perspectives (Barnes et al. 2020; Franceschet and
Piscopo 2014; Schwindt-Bayer 2011). We draw a distinction
between white- and blue-collar workers given the importance
of class in shaping political experiences. In Latin America,
for example, legislators from working-class back grounds (i.e.,
blue collar) bring different policy priorities (Micozzi 2018)
to the legislative process than do white-collar professionals.
We also include a subcategory of whether the politician has
prior political experience. In their study of cabinet ministers,
Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2016) explain that
it is critical to consider political connections because they
can be at least as valuable as skills and policy expertise. They
signal loyalty to political leaders and increase the likelihood
that individuals can navigate political issues. If quotas incite
leaders to expand beyond their established networks to recruit politicians, we may see a change in the share of legislators with previous political and party positions.

experience into our measure because we assume that people who previously
held these positions are already in the eligibility pool of candidates for party
recruitment before the implementation of the gender quota. We rely on the
coding rules devised by Barnes et al. (2020).

To calculate the index, these values are then aggregated to
the chamber-year level, so that each chamber-year in our
data set has a percentage of women and men who have held
(or not) each of these positions. The sum of squares of those
measures is taken, divided by six (given the number of variables), and subtracted from one. The mean of the overall
professional diversity index is 0.362, with a standard deviation of 0. 053 (see table A2). We present the professional
diversity index for the chamber in the left half of ﬁgure 2,
compared against the percentage of women in the chamber
and the years since quotas. As shown, professional diversity
varies widely across the chamber-years and increases with
the share of women in the body and the years since quotas.
Second, we create a personal diversity index that incorporates the chamber-year calculations of whether a legislator
(1) has children, (2) is married, and (3) reports no college
education, a bachelor’s degree or equivalent, or an advanced
degree. The mean of the overall personal diversity index is
0.390 with a standard deviation of 0.065. Personal diversity is
another critically important dimension on which legislators
vary. Indeed, legislators’ personal backgrounds—ranging
from education to child-bearing and marital status—inﬂuence representatives’ behavior (Schwindt-Bayer 2011; Sharrow
et al. 2018).
We expect a similar relationship but anticipate the relationship may be weaker given that personal diversiﬁcation
would be a by-product of the increase in professional diversiﬁcation. For example, although party-recruiting patterns
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may have a direct impact on the positions of power that
parties look to for new candidates, those same parties are less
likely to look to a group of parents or single individuals. Instead, the change in the professional network may also mean
a natural evolution in the personal backgrounds of those who
serve. The descriptive characteristics of the personal diversity
index are presented in the right half of ﬁgure 2. Overall, there
is a 39% chance that two legislators drawn from the full sample will have different personal backgrounds. Women’s and
men’s personal diversity levels are similar to the overall level.5

Key variables of interest
We measure the time since quota adoption as the difference
between the year the survey was conducted and the year that
quotas were ﬁrst adopted in each provincial chamber. This
variable ranges from a low of zero in the 2014 Santa Fe Senate
to a high of 20 in the 2014 Santa Fe House. As Santa Fe has
never adopted a gender quota for the Senate, but was one of
the early adopters in the House, the two chambers in Santa Fe
represent the extremes in our data. Notably, the within and
between province variation means that quota years do not
covary with other time-variant factors such as development or
women’s economic integration, which do not vary between
different chambers in the same province. We measure women’s numeric representation using the percentage of women
in the chamber session at the time the survey was conducted.
The percentage of women in the legislative chamber ranges
from 5% in the 2012 Santa Fe Senate to 45% in the 2014
Corrientes Senate.

Control variables
We control for a variety of economic and political factors
that have the potential to shape (1) the diversity of women
(and men) in political ofﬁce, (2) when and whether a chamber
has adopted quotas, and (3) the overall level of women’s
numeric representation in the chamber. We control for political institutions via the average district magnitude (logged)
from which legislators in the chamber are elected. District
magnitude inﬂuences women’s access to ofﬁce (Jones 1998)
and may also inﬂuence the types of women who have access
to ofﬁce. In provinces with very large district magnitudes,
women—and perhaps legislators more generally—tend to be
drawn from the urban centers. These women may have more
homogenous career backgrounds then women in chambers
5. The combination of components in the diversity measure means
that it takes a log form after eight individuals. With a very small N, the
measure is dependent on a single member in the group. Once we exceed
eight, the possible number of combinations is 8, so each change in a
background characteristic of an individual legislator results in a diminished change in the overall measure.

that are drawn from across the province, as is the case in
chambers with multimember districts. Further, we may expect more personal diversity among legislators when they are
drawn from the urban center, as it is easier for women with
children to hold elected posts and attend committee meetings
and legislative sessions if they live in the capital. We also
control for whether the chamber is a Senate or House/Unicameral Chamber. Senates are more prestigious than lower
chambers, thus senators may be drawn from a narrower set of
backgrounds than are deputies and be less likely to be women.
There is one province in our sample (Santa Fe) where the
upper and lower chamber did not implement quotas simultaneously. In this circumstance, there could be spillover effects in the selection and recruitment strategies across chambers, as the same party bosses recruit candidates for both
chambers. This would bias our results toward the null. Moreover, spillover in recruitment and selection is likely minimized
when senators and deputies are drawn from different pools; for
example, in the case of Santa Fe, senators are selected from
single member districts across the entire province, whereas
deputies are selected from one province-wide district and are,
thus, more likely to come from urban centers.
We have theoretical reason to believe that high unemployment will both increase diversity in the legislature, particularly among men, and be associated with lower levels of
women’s numeric representation and years since quotas. Speciﬁcally, as unemployment increases, women are often pushed
out of the economy to make room for men—the traditional
breadwinners (Karamessini and Rubery 2013). This means
that men occupy a wider range of jobs in contexts with high
unemployment, and more jobs are likely regarded as potential
recruitment grounds for male politicians. Likewise, it is possible that quotas are less likely to be adopted (and hence women’s descriptive representation is likely to be low) in the context of low economic development. To account for this, we
control for the level of unemployment in the province with
unemployment data from the Argentinian Ministry of Economics. It ranges from 4% in Mendoza to 10.6% in Santa Fe.
Women may have more opportunities in the public and
private sector, resulting in both more diversity among women
in ofﬁce and a higher share of women in ofﬁce, in provinces
with higher levels of gender equality. We use the GenderRelated Development Index (GDI) to measure gender equality
in each province. The measure accounts for gender differences
in life expectancy rates, adult literacy rates, and standards of
living. As gender disparities increase, the value of the GDI
decreases. GDI data come from the UN Development Programme’s human development reports in 2006, 2009, and
2011. In our sample, GDI ranges from 0.797 in Misiones to
0.887 in the Federal District.
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Modeling strategy
Given that our dependent variable is theoretically bound between 0 and 1, we estimate generalized linear models (GLMs)
with a Gaussian distribution and a normal link function. The
results are displayed in table 1. Ordinary least squares replication is available in table A5.

EXPLAINING LEGISLATIVE DIVERSITY
We theorized that increases in women’s numeric representation would be associated with increases in legislative diversity and that the adoption of gender quotas work to reshape
political party recruitment tactics and broaden the network
from which women are drawn. As expected, in table 1 models 1 and 2, we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant increase for professional diversity as the percentage of women in the chamber increases (the positive relationship for personal diversity
is limited to women legislators). We also ﬁnd that, consistent
with expectations, the longer quotas are in place, the more diversity there is in the legislative chamber.
Importantly, in most models, women’s numeric representation and years since quota are independently associated
with an increase in legislative diversity, thus demonstrating
support for our theory that the adoption of a gender quota
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fosters legislative diversity through two distinct and interrelated mechanisms. To evaluate the magnitude of these
relationships, we calculate the expected value of the professional and personal diversity indexes for different values of
interest, while all other values are held at their means and
dummy variables are set to their modes. Figure 3 plots these
expected values surrounded by 90% conﬁdence intervals.
The top of ﬁgure 3 charts the increase in women’s numeric representation on the X-axis and the expected value
for professional/personal diversity on the Y-axis. Recall that
the diversity indexes represent the probability that if we drew
two legislators from the same chamber, they would have
different professional backgrounds. Higher (lower) values
indicate that legislators have more distinct (similar) backgrounds. As women’s numeric representation increases from
5% to 45%, women’s professional diversity increases from
0.316 to 0.412. In other words: as women’s numeric representation increases from the minimum to the maximum, the
odds that two legislators will have different professional backgrounds increases from about three in seven to one in ﬁve. We
do not ﬁnd, however, that increases in the share of women are
associated with personal diversity. Instead, the line depicted in
ﬁgure 3B is ﬂat and insigniﬁcant. In sum, these results indicate

Table 1. Professional and Personal Diversity
Chamber Wide

% women
Quota years
Log(district magnitude)
Senate
Unemployment
GDI
Constant
N legislators
N chamber-years

Women

Men

Professional
(1)

Personal
(2)

Professional
(3)

Personal
(4)

Professional
(5)

Personal
(6)

.239***
(.048)
.006***
(.002)
2.017
(.016)
2.047***
(.017)
.008***
(.002)
.370*
(.213)
2.094
(.173)
1,468
31

2.028
(.060)
.015***
(.001)
2.016**
(.008)
2.003
(.010)
.017***
(.001)
.842***
(.201)
2.566***
(.172)
1,716
36

.251***
(.097)
.012***
(.004)
.032
(.025)
2.017
(.030)
.005
(.006)
.534
(.339)
2.448*
(.272)
420
31

.420***
(.126)
.019***
(.003)
.030
(.025)
.073*
(.041)
.013*
(.008)
2.166
(.397)
2.060
(.341)
491
36

.134*
(.072)
.007***
(.003)
2.018
(.022)
2.060**
(.026)
.013***
(.004)
.405
(.362)
2.151
(.306)
1,044
31

2.206
(.137)
.015***
(.002)
2.014
(.019)
2.027
(.027)
.019***
(.003)
1.117***
(.331)
2.777***
(.259)
1,225
36

Note. Standard errors in parentheses. GDI p Gender-Related Development Index.
* p ! .10.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
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Figure 3. Chamber-wide professional (left) and personal (right) legislative diversity. Expected values calculated using results in table 1 models 1 and 2; all
other values held at their mean/mode.

that increases in women’s presence are associated with more
diversity in legislators’ professional backgrounds before entering ofﬁce but not with their personal backgrounds.
Interviews with provincial-level legislators in Argentina
provide evidence consistent with our argument that increases in women’s numeric representation may work to
transform potential candidates’ and party leaders’ ideas about
who is qualiﬁed for ofﬁce. Whereas political parties historically have done the minimum to comply with quotas, interviews suggest that more than 15 years after the adoption of
quotas, parties view women as competitive politicians and
sometimes recruit them to compete at the top of the legislative list. As a Mendoza senator explained: “You can see how
the change is spreading, there are cases where we do not even
need the quota. . . . But that is still not the norm.”6 She was not
the only one to suggest that women are starting to “earn” a
seat at the table on the basis of their qualiﬁcations apart from
the quota and that today more women, including younger
women, are being recruited to compete at the top of the list.7
These interviews illustrate that women’s presence in ofﬁce
has worked to alter views about who is qualiﬁed to hold ofﬁce.
Next, we theorized that independent of women’s numeric
representation, the increases in the time since the adoption
of gender quotas is also positively associated with legislative
diversity. In the bottom of ﬁgure 3, we plot the years since
quota adoption (on the X-axis) and increases in diversity (on

6. Author interview with female provincial senator, Mendoza 2013.
7. Author interview with female provincial deputy, Neuquén 2010.
Author interview with female provincial deputy, Salta 2013.

the Y-axis). As the number of quota years increases from
zero to 20, professional legislative diversity increases from
0.291 to 0.415, with a steady increase across the time since
quota adoption. Likewise, personal legislative diversity increases from 0.198 to 0.491 over the range of years since quota
adoption, suggesting that quotas are a powerful mechanism
for increasing all forms of legislative diversity.
Representatives saw parties and recruitment networks as
insular but also suggested that quotas may be transforming
the selection and recruitment process. A former deputy from
Neuquén explained that “due to our culture, the ﬁrst women
who got there [to the legislature] were family members.” But
over time, “Women without the last names, without husbands
in politics, started to earn their spots.”8 Views like this help
to illustrate the idea that simply increasing women’s numeric
representation in the ﬁrst election, without legislative turnover, could result in a rather homogenous group of women.
The comments further illustrate that when parties are forced
to comply with quotas election after election, they move beyond their established networks—in this case, powerful political families—to recruit women.

WOMEN’S AND MEN’S DIVERSITY
A major implication of our theory is that if quotas do diversify the legislature through changes to party recruitment
and conceptualizations of acceptable leaders, then increases
in women’s numeric representation and time since quota
8. Author interview with female former provincial deputy, Neuquén
2010.
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adoption should not just increase legislative diversity via
women’s characteristics but also work to produce diversity
among men in ofﬁce. Speciﬁcally, we posit that the same
mechanisms that work to redeﬁne perceptions of what it
means to be a qualiﬁed politician and to broaden the networks from which parties draw candidates will increase diversity among men.
To test these implications, we evaluate whether increases
in chamber-wide diversity are driven exclusively by large
increases in women’s diversity or whether men are also diversifying. We ﬁrst calculate the professional and personal
indexes for the subset of men and women in the chamber.
We present each of the diversity indexes compared against
the percentage of women in the chamber and the years
since quotas in ﬁgure 4. As shown, professional and personal diversity varies widely across the chamber-years. With
the exception of men’s personal diversity and the percentage
of women in the chamber, both women’s and men’s professional and personal diversity increases with the share of
women in the chamber and the years since quotas.
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Next, we estimate models for each using GLMs and
present the results in table 1 models 3–6 and in ﬁgure 5.
Turning ﬁrst to professional diversity, models 3 and 5
demonstrate that increases in women’s numeric representation are also associated with increases in both women’s and
men’s professional diversity, providing support for hypothesis 3. Figures 5A and 5C show the magnitude of this
relationship. As women’s numeric representation increases
from 5% to 45%, women’s professional diversity increases
from 0.264 to 0.364 and men’s professional diversity increases from 0.323 to 0.376. Although the increases in men’s
professional diversity are more modest than the increases in
women’s professional diversity, the change is statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that results observed in the chamber-wide
analysis are not driven by increases in women’s diversity alone.
Moreover, the lower intercept for women’s professional diversity indicates that women tend to have much lower levels of
diversity than men when there are only a few women in the
chamber, but when women occupy upward of 45% of the seats
in the legislature, the women in ofﬁce are as diverse as the men.

Figure 4. Women’s (left half ) and men’s (right half ) professional and personal legislative diversity measures by the percentage of women in the chamber
(table A3 models 3 and 5, table A4 models 3 and 5) and the number of years since quota (table A3 models 4 and 6, table A4 models 4 and 6). Line represents
correlation best ﬁt. Betas, standard errors, and r-squared values from bivariate ordinary least squares regression models shown (see tables A3 and A4 for
bivariate results). Individual components of the indexes are compared against the percentage of women and the years since quota in ﬁgures A3–A6.
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Figure 5. Women’s (left half ) and men’s (right half ) professional and personal legislative diversity. Expected values calculated using results in table 1
models 3–6; all other values held at their mean/mode.

Turning to personal diversity, an increase from 5% to 45%
women is associated with an increase from 0.228 to 0.392 on
women’s personal diversity index (ﬁg. 5B), yet the same
trend does not hold for men. Rather, as women’s numeric
representation increases from 5% to 45%, men’s personal
diversity (ﬁg. 5D) decreases from 0.417 to 0.334—albeit a
relationship that is not statistically signiﬁcant at the p ! :10
level. Thus, for men’s personal diversity, we do not ﬁnd
support for hypothesis 3. This ﬁnding may be unsurprising
given that personal background is not a criterion that men
are typically evaluated on in the political arena. Whereas
men tend to be judged primarily on professional backgrounds,
women running for ofﬁce are typically evaluated on both personal and professional characteristics (Thomas and Bittner
2017). For example, motherhood is a salient identity used to
convey important information about women’s political preferences and priorities, but voters rarely use fatherhood to judge
the appropriateness of candidates (Greenlee 2014). Consistent
with this research, our analysis indicates that increases in
women’s numeric representation work to erode norms about
the type of women who need to be elected but does not necessarily shape norms about men’s personal lives.
That said, the relationship between women’s representation and men’s professional diversity supports our theory.
If party leaders were simply increasing women’s legislative
diversity by choosing elite women or by selecting unqualiﬁed
women to stand for ofﬁce, increases in women’s numeric
representation would not be associated with changes in

men’s professional diversity. Yet we observe a positive relationship between women’s representation and men’s professional diversity, indicating that women’s access to the
legislature may be working to transform ideas about representation, thereby broadening the pool of eligible men. That
women’s numeric representation is associated with men’s
professional diversity also helps illustrate the validity of our
dependent variable. If diversity was simply an artifact of the
overall increase in the number of women in ofﬁce, then we
would expect either no relationship or an inverse relationship as the pool of men shrinks and becomes more homogenous. The positive correlation we observe suggest this
is not an artifact of the measure; instead, increasing women’s
access to ofﬁce serves to recast the role of political leaders.
The demands placed on party leaders to ﬁll gender quotas
should work to slowly erode the gendered norms and processes governing political recruitment, particularly in environments with high legislative turnover. To this end, we
anticipated that party leaders would begin to draw candidates from outside of the established power networks, resulting in more diversity among both female and male politicians. Table 1 models 3–6 demonstrate support for this
expectation (hypothesis 4). That is, we ﬁnd that increases in
the number of years since quota adoption is also positively
correlated with both women’s and men’s professional and
personal diversity. The bottom of ﬁgure 5 illustrates that as
the number of quota years increases from 0 to 20, the expected level of women’s professional diversity increases from
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0.168 to 0.408, with a steady increase across the time since
quota adoption. Likewise, men’s professional diversity increases from 0.26 to 0.41. Finally, turning to personal diversity, we ﬁnd that increases in quota years are associated
with a positive and signiﬁcant increase in women’s and men’s
personal diversity. As ﬁgures 5F and 5H show, women’s
personal diversity increases from 0.082 to 0.461, and men’s
from 0.198 to 0.490, as quota years increases from 0 to 20.
The low level of professional diversity in the absence of
gender quotas is consistent with our understanding of the
legislative recruitment process. As one provincial deputy
from Jujuy (a province that had not yet adopted a quota at
the time of the interview and one of the few provinces with a
sizable indigenous population) put it: “What represents us
are men, intellectuals, the majority whites.” Men who are
elected to ofﬁce in her province have, she explained, “economic power—that is fundamental—a little knowledge, and
a social network that supports them.”9 Interviews with other
legislators likewise indicate that many politicians gain their
positions in power via access to political networks. As one
Mendoza deputy suggests, “obedient” women legislators (Carrió 2003, 170) are just as common as “obedient” men: “I always defend the quota. Although they say that it is used to put
friends, the obsequious servants, [in ofﬁce], there is everything. As with men, there are friends, there are obsequious
servants. And there are people with political experience and
political loyalty. These are the rules of the game of politics.”10
Interviews explain it is not that qualiﬁed women do not exist,
it is that they are absent from the party’s networks. As a
senator from Mendoza put it, women are underrepresented in
politics because party leaders “don’t look [for women]. There
are millions of capable women in the province.”11 Despite the
political networks that fuel the candidate recruitment and
selection process, our models indicate that quotas work to
diversify legislative recruitment over time.
The results from our second set of analyses show that
increases in women’s numeric representation and the years
since quota adoption are both independently associated with
increases in men’s professional diversity. But only the years
since quota adoption is associated with an increase in men’s
personal diversity. The distinction is important because it
indicates that although an increase in women’s numeric
representation is important for facilitating diversity among
men, women’s numeric representation alone is not sufﬁcient
to accelerate diversity. Instead, restructuring patterns of political recruitment requires gender quotas.
9. Author interview with female provincial deputy, Jujuy 2009.
10. Author interview with female provincial deputy, Mendoza 2013;
emphasis added.
11. Author interview with female senator, Mendoza 2013.
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OTHER FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH
LEGISLATIVE DIVERSITY
Our model includes four control variables that we believe are
theoretically correlated with both our dependent variables
and the two key variables of interest. District magnitude is
not signiﬁcantly associated with legislative diversity in any of
the models except for personal diversity, in the chamberwide analysis, where there is a negative signiﬁcant relationship. We are agnostic about this relationship. Looking at our
control for prestige, the Senate, our models indicate lower
levels of professional diversity both among men and chamber wide in the Senate, indicating that the more elite nature
of the Senate may result in a narrower recruitment pool.
Unemployment is positive and signiﬁcantly associated with
both personal and professional diversity in all cases except
women’s professional diversity, which is in line with the
argument that as unemployment increases, women are often
pushed out of the economy to make room for men (Karamessini and Rubery 2013). The more general trend, however,
suggests that in poor economic circumstances, societal elites
who are likely to be tracked into politics hold a more diverse
range of occupations. Finally, GDI is negative and signiﬁcantly associated with men’s personal diversity, and professional and personal diversity chamber wide, suggesting that
more gender equality is associated with more professional
and personal diversity in the chamber.

CONCLUSION
Our results show that increases in women’s representation
and the adoption of legislative gender quotas work to increase legislative diversity. Although both factors are important for eroding traditional pathways to power, absent
an institutional intervention such as legislative quotas, increases in women’s numeric representation alone are associated with only modest increases in legislative diversity. Indeed, the substantive effect of quotas is much stronger for
professional and personal diversity chamber wide and for both
women and men.
We push the research on quotas in a new direction by
thinking more broadly about diversity. Speciﬁcally, we theorize that quotas may interrupt entrenched patterns of political recruitment, giving way to a more diverse set of men
and women in political ofﬁce. To evaluate support for our
argument, we leverage a novel measurement of diversity
(that simultaneously accounts for different aspects of diversity) and test our argument using data on the composition
of legislative bodies over time. In demonstrating that quotas
give way to a more professionally and personally diverse
legislature, we underscore the importance of considering the
broader and somewhat unintended consequences of increasing
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women’s representation. Our new measure of legislative diversity constitutes a unique contribution to the research on
representation, as it can be applied to any group of representatives, is ﬂexible to accommodate different aspects of
diversity (e.g., professional or personal backgrounds), and
can easily be adapted to a variety of contexts.
Our results provide evidence in support of our theory that
quotas change the way political parties operate and recruit.
We argue that quotas force parties to change their eligibility
pool. In this way, even when quotas are speciﬁcally aimed
at increasing women’s representation, these structures may
destroy the “myth of meritocracy” (Besley et al. 2017; Murray
2014) and require that parties ﬁnd the better candidate, rather
than the convenient candidate from their insular network
(Cruz et al. 2017).
Our theory and ﬁndings are particularly important, as
they provide additional evidence for the argument that quotas
may enhance the representation of both men and women
(Murray 2014). Scholars have long recognized that the disruption of male-dominated networks can have downstream
effects in transforming institutions for women. We contribute
to this line of scholarship by evaluating the relationship between quotas and women’s and men’s diversity. Research has
shown that only men have access to various types of political
capital, which tends to structure electoral success and limits
women’s access to political power (Bjarnegård 2013). Our
research ﬁnds evidence that by interrupting these patterns,
quotas shape men’s representation.
At the same time, we do not ﬁnd that quotas lead to the
selection of nonelite or unqualiﬁed men and women—instead, these new members are just different kinds of elite.
Evidence of this is found in the increased share of women
with college degrees and in white-collar jobs as the number
of quota years or as the share of women in the body increases
(see table A5). In this way, we both push back against the
existing scholarship that suggests quotas just replicate existing patterns (after all, we do ﬁnd differences in the level of
diversity chamber wide) and conﬁrm work that ﬁnds that
quotas often select elite women (Franceschet and Piscopo
2014). Indeed, within this framework, simply increasing
women’s representation may not fundamentally reshape existing patterns of privilege that structure access to ofﬁce or the
distribution of power within legislatures and political parties
(Barnes 2016; Holman 2015; O’Brien 2015). And, to the extent
that quotas disrupt the gendered patterns of selection and recruitment into the legislature, this may further incentivize party
bosses to preserve the gendered hierarchies that govern political
advancement beyond the legislature (Franceschet and Piscopo
2014; Kerevel 2019). Future research might evaluate the ways
quotas change how elites are viewed by parties and leaders and

the effect of quotas not just on diversity in selection but also on
diversity in ascension within parties (Folke and Rickne 2016).
A major contribution of our research is a new data set
that codes legislators’ biographical data across 36 chamber
sessions, which represents a large expansion over previous
studies. Extant research using biographical data is typically
limited to a very small number of chamber sessions. At the
same time, it is extremely difﬁcult to get systematic biographical data across a range of chamber sessions. Our analysis is
thus limited to a context where most chambers introduced
successful gender quotas, women’s numeric representation is
abysmal absent quotas, and there is high legislative turnover.
Despite the empirical focus on the Argentine context, our
theory is very general and should apply across a range of cases
in which countries have adopted legislative gender quotas
to increase women’s numeric representation. To further evaluate the independent relationship between gender quotas and
women’s numeric representation, future research should consider cases in which women gain access to legislatures in larger
shares absent the intervention of gender quotas and compare
those to cases in which increases in women’s numeric representation are a product of successful quotas. Research might
also evaluate how varying levels of turnover interact with
quotas to accelerate or decelerate the effect of quotas on legislative diversity, as well as querying whether high levels of
turnover might be sufﬁcient on their own to increase diversity
in legislators’ backgrounds, as turnover creates more opportunities for women to gain access to ofﬁce (Schwindt-Bayer
2005). Such research would be particularly important, given
the scholarly debate about the degree to which institutional
factors like term limits help or hinder the election of marginalized groups like women and people of color and the
degree to which legislative turnover shapes policy (Carter and
Nordstrom 2017).
Our ﬁndings demonstrate the need to think clearly about
gendered institutional patterns as drivers in perpetuating
homophily among political leaders. State-mandated legislative gender quotas, because they require proactive action by
parties and changes in recruitment networks, have the potential to promote a diverse group of women—and men—
who bring a broad set of qualiﬁcations to political ofﬁce.
Together, our ﬁndings contribute to the growing bodies of
work on class and political representation, diversity, gender
and politics, and electoral reform.
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Table A1: Chamber and Years included in Analysis
Province
Chamber
Professional Diversity
Buenos Aires
House
2007, 2009, 2011,
2013
Buenos Aires
Senate
2007, 2009, 2011,
2013
Corrientes
House
2009, 2011, 2013
Corrientes
Senate
2009, 2011, 2013
Federal District
Unicameral
2007, 2009, 2011,
2013
Mendoza
House
2007, 2009, 2011

Personal Diversity
2005, 2007, 2009,
2011, 2013
2005, 2007, 2009,
2011, 2013
2009, 2011, 2013
2009, 2011, 2013
2005, 2007, 2009,
2011, 2013
2005, 2007, 2009,
2011
Mendoza
Senate
2007, 2009, 2011
2005, 2007, 2009,
2011
Misiones
Unicameral
2007, 2009, 2011
2007, 2009, 2011
Santa Fe
House
2007, 2011
2007, 2011
Santa Fe
Senate
2007, 2011
2007, 2011
Note: Our sample includes every Chamber-year for which reliable data was available. The
Directorios Legislativo did not collect information on previous party experience for legislators
elected in 2005 so these observations are omitted form the professional diversity index.
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics Professional and Personal Diversity
Professional Diversity Index
Personal Diversity Index
Chamber
Women
Men
Chamber
Women
Men
Mean
Standard Deviation

0.362
0.053

0.331
0.106

0.340
0.052

0.390
0.065

0.357
0.120

0.370
0.078
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Table A3: Bivariate results: Professional Diversity
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Chamber-Wide Personal
Women’s Personal
Diversity
Diversity
% Women
0.003***
0.007***
(0.001)
(0.002)
Quota years
0.006***
0.019***
(0.002)
(0.003)
Constant
0.268***
0.284***
0.125**
0.085**
(0.026)
(0.027)
(0.051)
(0.041)
Observations
31
31
31
31
R2
0.322
0.237
0.381
0.583
Standard errors in parentheses * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

(5)
(6)
Men's Personal
Diversity
0.002*
(0.001)
0.005*
(0.003)
0.275***
0.276***
(0.037)
(0.035)
31
31
0.106
0.110

Table A4: Bivariate results: Personal Diversity
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Chamber-Wide Personal
Women’s Personal
Diversity
Diversity
% Women
0.002
0.007***
(0.001)
(0.002)
Quota years
0.009***
0.020***
(0.002)
(0.003)
Constant
0.347***
0.280***
0.145**
0.099**
(0.037)
(0.029)
(0.060)
(0.046)
Observations
36
36
36
36
2
R
0.041
0.318
0.289
0.508
Standard errors in parentheses * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

(5)
(6)
Men's Personal
Diversity
0.000
(0.002)
0.008**
(0.003)
0.364***
0.271***
(0.046)
(0.038)
36
36
0.001
0.179
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Table A5: Legislative Diversity: OLS
(1)

% Women
Quota Years
Log (DM)
Senate
Unemployment
GDI
Constant
R2
N Legislators
N Chamber-Years

(2)
Women
Professional Personal

(3)

(4)
Men
Professional Personal

(5)
(6)
Chamber-Wide
Professional Personal

0.247**
(0.107)
0.012**
(0.004)
0.031
(0.027)
-0.017
(0.033)
0.005
(0.007)
0.524
(0.373)
-0.442
(0.299)
0.770

0.420**
(0.138)
0.019***
(0.004)
0.030
(0.027)
0.073
(0.045)
0.013
(0.008)
-0.166
(0.436)
-0.060
(0.375)
0.680

0.134^
(0.080)
0.007**
(0.003)
-0.018
(0.025)
-0.060*
(0.029)
0.013**
(0.004)
0.405
(0.405)
-0.151
(0.342)
0.433

-0.206
(0.150)
0.015***
(0.002)
-0.014
(0.020)
-0.027
(0.030)
0.019***
(0.004)
1.117**
(0.363)
-0.777**
(0.285)
0.565

0.238***
(0.053)
0.006**
(0.002)
-0.018
(0.018)
-0.048**
(0.019)
0.008**
(0.003)
0.372
(0.238)
-0.096
(0.193)
0.592

-0.028
(0.066)
0.015***
(0.001)
-0.016*
(0.008)
-0.003
(0.011)
0.017***
(0.002)
0.842***
(0.220)
-0.566**
(0.189)
0.677

420
31

491
36

1,044
31

1,225
36

1,468
31

1,716
36

Standard errors in parentheses ^p= 13, * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01; This table shows that Models 1-6 in Table 1 in
the body of the manuscript are robust to OLS.
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Figure A1: Components of Chamber-Wide Professional Diversity and Covariance with Percent
Women and Quota years
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Figure A2: Components of Chamber-Wide Personal Diversity and Covariance with Percent
Women and Quota years
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Figure A3: Components of Women’s Professional Diversity and Covariance with Percent
Women and Quota years
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Figure A4: Components of Men’s Professional Diversity and Covariance with Percent Women
and Quota years
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Figure A5: Components of Women’s Personal Diversity and Covariance with Percent Women
and Quota years
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Figure A6: Components of Men’s Personal Diversity and Covariance with Percent Women and
Quota years
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Appendix B: Codebook
This codebook details the coding rules used for coding legislators’ professional and personal
diversity.
Professional categories:
Party:
Coded as zero if they do not list any party experience or say “no tiene”
Coded as one if they list any party experience
Coded as missing if they report “no responde” in the party category or if they did not
respond to any of the categories that we coded.
Private career:
Coded as zero if they do not list any private career or say “no tiene”
Coded as one if they list any private career experience
Coded as missing if they report “no responde” in the private career category or if they did
not respond to any of the categories that we coded.
Public career:
Coded as zero if they do not list any public career or say “no tiene”
Coded as one if they list any public career experience
Coded as missing if they report “no responde” in the public career category or if they did
not respond to any of the categories that we coded.
Blue collar:
Coded as zero if they do not list any of the blue collar career positions
Coded as one if they list any service or worker in their public or private career
Coded as missing if they report “no responde” in the public or private career category or
if they did not respond to any of the categories that we coded.
White collar:
Coded as zero if they do not list any of the white collar career positions
Coded as one if they list any business, private sector professional, lawyer experience in
their private or public career
Coded as missing if they report “no responde” in the public or private career category or
if they did not respond to any of the categories that we coded.
Politician:
Coded as zero if they do not list any of the politician career positions
Coded as one if they list city council, mayor, minister, secretary, sub-secretary, governor,
legislator, senator, ambassador, consultant, public lawyers, delegate, party president,
party treasurer, party secretary, party lawyer, political consultant, or lobbyist.
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Personal diversity categories:
Children:
Coded zero if they report zero children or if they report “no tiene”
Coded 1 if they report at least one child
Coded missing if they report “no responde” or if the category is blank
Married:
Coded zero if they report to be single, divorced, or cohabitating
Coded one if they report to be married
Coded missing if they report “no responde” or if the category is blank
College Education:
Coded zero if they do not report having any higher education or report some sort of
training (technical degree) in the education category.
Coded one if they report a bachelors equivalent or higher.
Coded missing if they report is “no responde” or if the category is blank
No education:
Coded zero if they report a bachelors equivalent or higher or report some sort of training
(technical degree) in the education category.
Coded one if they do not report having any higher education
Coded missing if they report is “no responde” or if the category is blank
Some college:
Coded one if they report a bachelors equivalent or if they do not report having any higher
education higher
Coded one if they report some sort of training (technical degree) in the education
category.
Coded missing if they report is “no responde” or if the category is blank
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